The constitutional politics of the European Union have been intensely debated in recent times. A key concern, voiced both within the academy and at street level, is how citizens could be endowed with the ability to shape, revise and legitimise evolving constitutional settlements. This paper begins by discussing recent accounts of 'constituent power' in the EU that seek to offer guidance in this respect. It argues that these accounts are normatively insightful but ultimately stop short of providing a viable model of constitutional agency. The remainder of the paper then aims to examine what such a model could look like, looking for inspiration to the muchneglected political practice of transnational partisanship. Specifically, the paper examines the transnationally coordinated constitution-making efforts of Christian Democratic partisans in the founding period of the EU, suggesting that there is much to learn from these efforts as far as EU constitutional politics is concerned.
Transnational Partisanship and Networked Constituent Power in the EU

Introduction
The constitutional politics of the European Union have been intensely debated in recent times. One widespread perception animating the debate is that the constitutionalisation of the EU polity has taken place in a largely apolitical fashion, in a process driven by decisions of courts, notably the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), that are taken in isolation from political contestation and popular participation (e.g. Glencross 2014; Grimm 2015; Scharpf 2017) . This has led to increased calls for the politicisation of the EU constitutional order (e.g. Fabbrini 2016; Glencross 2014; Niesen 2017 ). Accordingly, citizens should be endowed with the ability to shape, revise and legitimise evolving constitutional settlements.
This view is not only voiced within the academy. Analogous concerns have also been expressed at the street level, perhaps most prominently in the panEuropean movement DiEM25. DiEM's express ambition is to establish a European constituent assembly, in which the citizens of Europe should deliberate on how to transform the EU into a 'full-fledged democracy' (DiEM25, 2017) . The goal is to transform the citizens of Europe into a constituent power capable of revising the constitutional features of the EU at large.
The normative logic underpinning these scholarly and activist perspectives is as old as modern democracy itself: if the EU is to be a democratic constitutional order, then its citizens must be the source of that order, and the subjects with whom sovereignty ultimately rests (Habermas 2011; Cohen 2012) . But how exactly should we think of constituent power in the EU? It is one thing to stress the importance of enhanced constitutional agency, and quite another to provide a model of how constitutional agency can and should be exercised.
As a response to this question, a small number of political and legal theorists have recently elaborated sophisticated accounts of constituent power in the EU that are intended to resolve these complex normative and conceptual issues (Cheneval 2011; Crum 2012; Habermas 2011; Niesen 2017; Patberg 2017; von Achenbach 2017) . In this paper, I begin by outlining these accounts. I suggest that there are good reasons to favour accounts of 'mixed' constituent power, as defended by Jürgen Habermas (2011) and others, over ones that see constituent power as resting solely with the peoples of EU member states. However, I also show that existing accounts of that kind are inadequate, inasmuch as they under-theorise how real-world citizens can come to act as constituent power in the first place. The remainder of the paper then aims to explore how the abstract principles of pouvoir constituant mixte may be connected to political practice. I look for inspiration to a much-neglected political practice -transnational partisanship.
Drawing on the case of Christian Democratic transnationalism, I specifically discuss how partisan networks honed by like-minded political activists and elected representatives from different European states have provided the backbone for Christian Democrats' successful exercise of supra-state constituent power. This distinctive mode of cross-border organisation and coordination helps imagine how today's citizens can engage as agents of EU constitutional politics.
Although the model of partisanship-driven 'networked constituent power' has many attractive features, and has been proven to be in principle feasible, it cannot be adopted without modifications. Three revisions are central, I suggest: contrary to the Christian Democratic reliance on elite-driven politics, contemporary transnational partisan networks aimed at exercising constituent power must be open to citizen participation; contrary to Christian Democratic practice in the post-war years, they must be ready to submit actions to public approval; and in contrast to the Christian Democratic insistence on religious establishment, they must develop a more inclusive justificatory rationale for their constitutional agenda.
In sum, the paper argues that there is much to learn from Christian Democratic transnationalism when it comes to the exercise of constituent power in the EU -first because it offers a promising general model for organising and coordinating constitutional agency, and second because reflecting on its less attractive features permits us to see which mistakes are to be avoided in future efforts to politicise the EU constitutional order.
Constituent Power in the EU
A polity can be considered democratic if power vests ultimately in 'the people.' This is the essence of the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty that underpins most democratic constitutional orders. The people of a democratic polity is accordingly ascribed the status of constituent power -the agent to whose will the original constitution can be traced and who retains the authority to decide all issues of constitutional design. This means that the people are endowed with two powers: the power to legitimately bring a democratic constitutional order into existence, and the power to reform its foundational norms and rule as they see fit (see Arato 2016; Böckenförde 2006; Kalyvas 2005; Loughlin 2014 ).
On the face of it, it is difficult to make sense of this concept in the context of the European Union (Walker 2007) . For the EU is not a democratic federal state with a central constitutional document that can in some relevant sense be seen as the product of 'the people,' but a supranational polity that has developed from a relatively loose association of nation states into a constitutional order comprising of multiple member states (on the nation state/member state distinction, see Bickerton 2012; on EU constitutionalisation, see Grimm 2015) .
Who might in this polity be the agent to whom the ultimate authority to decide constitutional issues can be attributed, and who is thus responsible for enacting constitutional reform and revision?
Two different responses to that question have emerged in the recent political theory literature. The first assumes that the EU is 'not constituted by a single people or "demos"' (Crum 2012: 45) but that it has 'several pouvoirs constituants,' namely the demoi of the member states (Cheneval et al. 2015: 4; Cheneval 2011) . Authors defending this sort of position follow broadly Rawlsian argumentative strategies, invoking such devices as an 'original position' and 'public reason,' and suggest that decisions about EU constitutional design ought to be determined by the member states' peoples.
As Cheneval et al. (2015: 4) write, 'sovereign decisions' such as treaty ratifications 'are to be taken by or [must be] directly accountable to the pouvoir constituant of the states which are the citizens organized as People.' Different conclusions have been drawn concerning this account's implications for the politicisation of the EU constitutional order. Some scholars take it to imply that the member states' peoples must participate in a direct and unmediated fashion in EU constitutional politics (Cheneval 2011: 133-137 ).
Other authors accept that constitutional decisions of this sort may be made by elected representatives, but affirm the positive role direct-democratic mechanisms can play in incentivising representatives to aim at constitutional decisions that all those subject to it can accept (Crum 2012) . Either way, the subjects exercising constitutional agency always ought to be the member state's demoi.
One straightforward reason to find this strategy appealing is that locating constituent power in the demoi of EU member states seems to be descriptively accurate, inasmuch as member states are often said to remain the 'masters of the treaties' (Grimm 2016: 56-58) ; so from the point of view of realism, the first account has much going for it. Yet, as several commentators have pointed out, the focus on domestic pouvoirs constituants faces sizable obstacles. If constituent power refers here, as it typically does, to the more or less unrestrained competence to establish and revise constitutional orders, does this mean that member states' constituent powers also operate in an unbound fashion when they engage constitutional politics at the EU level? And if that is the case, what happens when conflicts between multiple pouvoirs constituants arise?
The first account of constituent power in the EU has no answers to these questions. Its assumption that the constituent power of the member states' peoples simply extends beyond the state, as if 'the involvement in EU constitutional politics represented just another mode of intra-state constitutional revision' (Patberg 2017: 206) , indeed veils these problems. At work seems here the contestable Schmittian assumption that the allocation of constituent power is an either-or question, such that any exercise of constituent power beyond the state is bound to nullify the constituent power at the state level (cf. Cohen 2012: ch. 2).
Aiming to overcome such a view, the second account of constituent power in the EU that has been proposed in the recent literature on the topic offers a possible way forward. The suggestion is to conceive constituent power in the EU as pouvoir constituant mixte, understood as a supra-state constituent power in which individuals participate in their dual capacity as members of the member states' demoi, on the one hand, and Union citizens, on the other.
One prominent author who has developed such a view is Jürgen Habermas (2011; . In his more recent work on the topic, Habermas specifically imagines a complex European constituent assembly in which delegates, represented in their two 'personae,' deliberate over the constitutional features of the EU (Habermas 2017; cf. Habermas 2011: 68-70 ). The thought is that, in such an assembly, individuals are 'able to address the other side with the aim of striking a balance between their respective interests' (Habermas 2017: 174) , and thus able to devise constitutional norms and rules that prevent potential conflicts between the member states' pouvoirs constituants, whilst ensuring that individuals' normative expectations vis-à-vis the EU are given adequate expression.
Importantly, Habermas' approach is not intended as a descriptive account of how supra-state constituent power can operate as a real social force. Instead, its purpose is to demonstrate to what extent certain elements of the current EU constitutional order can be justified from an 'idealised participants perspective,' and which require revision (Habermas 2011: 69) . Habermas' strategy is to start from the presumption that the EU has already assumed a democratic character as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon, and then conduct a 'rational reconstruction' of the practice of law-making and implementation in the post-Lisbon Treaty EU. Analogous to his more generalised reconstructive approach, as developed in Between Facts and Norms (1994) , this entails asking what hypothetical delegates to a European constituent assembly would decide in an idealised rational dialogue about the EU's constitutional foundations.
No doubt, the notion of pouvoir constituant mixte presents a significant advance in theorising about constitutional agency in the EU. It can powerfully overcome the problems noted in connection with the first account of constituent power in the EU. Yet, if one seeks an action-guiding model of EU constitutional politics, Habermas' account is the wrong place to look. For, since it conceives suprastate constituent power in purely hypothetical terms, as a post hoc justificatory device for existing institutional arrangements, it effectively accepts that constitutional norms can plausibly be articulated in isolation from procedures of political contestation -without the participation of those to whom these norms are supposed to apply.
On a strong reading, one might say that Habermas' perspective provides not so much a solution to the problem that the constitutionalisation of the EU polity has taken place in a largely apolitical fashion, but a justification for the apolitical process of constitutionalisation that has so often been lamented. Although
Habermas is generally sympathetic to a 'more democratic' EU, he stops short of offering prescriptions concerning the politicisation of the EU constitutional order.
That Habermas conceives EU constitutional politics in purely counter-factual terms also raises another problem. Even if his approach of 'rational reconstruction' could settle all questions to do with the constitution of the EU at a particular moment in time, constitutional norms must -at least to some extent -be adapted to an evolving historical context. In relegating citizens to passive recipients of norms, however, Habermas' account leaves little room for bringing shifting preferences regarding their political communities and forms of collective organisation to bear on decisions concerning constitutional design.
To better understand this worry, consider Habermas' interpretation of the domestic dimension of the pouvoir constituant mixte. This is almost exclusively conservationist, in the sense that Habermas imputes to the citizens of member states' demoi a strong and stable commitment to conserve the 'revolutionary constitutional achievements of the past' (e.g. Habermas 2011: 70; also see von Achenbach 2017: 196 ). Yet even if citizens are currently so inclined, they might at some point in the future wish to re-invent themselves as a political community, perhaps in a 'co-evolution with their other persona' (Niesen 2017: 190 ). An account of constituent power that allows for such shifts cannot however remain tied exclusively to philosophical reflection; citizens must be made active participants to constitution-shaping, being able to translate rearticulations of member state communities into constitutional arrangements.
Moving beyond a purely counterfactual perspective, a number of scholars have asked how Habermas' notion of pouvoir constituant mixte might inspire the exercise of constitutional agency in the real world.
1 Niesen (2017: 190-191 The most urgent questions to be explored in greater detail have to do with concrete and feasible organisational models for supra-state constituent power in the EU, the ideational resources that can support and sustain the collective pursuit of supra-state constitution-making, and the channels from which the sociological legitimacy of such efforts -roughly, the extent to which exercises of constituent power in the EU are considered legitimate by European citizens -can be expected to flow. The latter is of special relevance for a theory of constituent power that aspires to be democratic in the less philosophical sense of allowing space for contestation and dynamic change. Indeed, the fact that there is a 'deep relationship' (Arato 2016: 131) between sociological legitimacy and a democratic understanding of constitutional change and revision follows directly from the earlier-elaborated commitment to transcending a purely counterfactual perspective on constituent power.
My burden in the remainder of the paper is to address these questions and articulate an empirically informed model of how supra-state constituent power may be exercised in the EU. To that end, I will explore a hitherto neglected form of supra-state constituent power that rests on transnational partisan networks, through which like-minded individuals from different political spheres coordinate with the aim of shaping the constitutional order of Europe.
Transnational partisanship and constituent power
Reflecting on the prior section's discussion, we may single out several desiderata that an account of constituent power in the EU must meet.
1) It must be a 'mixed' form of constituent power whose participants act both in their capacity as members of states and as members of a supranational polity;
2) it must allow for participation and contestation; and 3) the institutional properties of constituent power must be specified, in Let us look more closely at this form of political agency and explore whether it may satisfy the aforementioned desiderata.
Organising constituent power: Partisan networks
One of the defining features of the transnational partisan networks developed by Christian Democratic parties is that they were mainly structured around informal exchanges. Dialogue about shared commitments was a primary function of these exchanges: the purpose was to foster discussion between politically like-minded individuals from different national spheres. The topics addressed ranged from general reflections on the present state and possible 2 The following is indebted to the excellent historical accounts of Christian Democratic transnationalism in Kaiser (2007) and Papini (1997) , as well as the comprehensive edited volumes by Gehlen and Kaiser (2004) and Buchanan and Conway (1996) . A further major resource used here for the purposes of reconstructing the distinctive features of Christian Democratic transnational organisation is the Volume 4 of the Documents on the History of European Integration Series B (1990), edited by Lipgens and Loth. future of the jointly espoused political project, to more specific questions to do with connecting principles to practice (Gisch 1990; Kaiser 2007: esp. ch. 5) . Here the more general nature of partisan practice makes itself visible: partisanship is not just about formulating political proposals, but also about implementing them (Rosenblum 2008; White and Ypi 2016) .
Insofar as transnational partisan coordination of this kind is about implementing political aims, it can be harnessed to realise objectives that single states cannot achieve on their own -for example by helping national parties synchronise their actions and activities in a way that allows them to execute larger tasks. From the point of view of EU constitutional politics, this is one of the most attractive features of this form of cross-border organisation, and the reason for why it can facilitate the exercise of supra-state constituent power.
There are two different, sequential roles that the Christian Democratic partisan networks performed in this connection -roles we may consider in turn.
The first is preparatory: transnational partisan networks can over time lay the groundwork for the future enactment of constituent power beyond the state, helping individuals to overcome difficult challenges associated with exercising power trans-or supranationally. Chief amongst these challenges is a lack of agreement among members of the network as to the goals to be pursued in concert. Likewise, the national parties that form the network may simply lack the means to directly translate their shared aims into decisions, for instance because they are not in government in their respective states. Transnational party networks can contribute to solving these problems, in that they provide platforms for cross-national dialogue aimed at devising common strategies to (Gisch 1990: 484) .
Importantly, as a practice of reasoning that involves individuals who are both members of nation states and potential members of a future supranational European order, the just-mentioned deliberations within SIPDIC may be interpreted as instantiating the sort of 'two-personae' exchanges envisaged in the Habermasian conception of pouvoir constituant mixte. In a sense, one may say that the success of SIPDIC was undermined by the fact that the interests tied to the first 'persona' -being a member of a particular nation state -were of greater significance to many of the participants than the interests associated with the (hypothetical) second persona. The French Popular Democrats, for one, mainly sought to use SIPDIC's network to foster alliances against revisions of the Versailles Treaty and, thus, also against the German Centre Party and Germany more generally. This created an atmosphere of mistrust among the parties and triggered numerous debates that were primarily about the assertion of national interests, rather than about goals shared by all network members.
This was to change in the post-war era, where, as we shall see, Christian
Democratic partisans were better able to bring their national commitments and trans-or supranational visions into equilibrium.
I now turn to the second role transnational partisan networks can serve, which is even more relevant to the question of constituent power than the first. This The Christian Democrats' transnational partisan networks were able to exercise this executive function mainly in the period after 1950, when Christian Democratic parties were the dominant political force in all six member states of the ECSC and EEC. Being connected to the relevant legislative and executive mechanisms in these states, the national parties were capable of realising politically their shared supra-state project of building the constitutional foundation of 'core Europe' -and their transnational network was a major enabling factor in these exercises of constituent power.
The first thing to note is that transnational party cooperation, notably via the consultations and congresses that took place in the newly-established NEI and the more informal Geneva Circle, promoted the homogenisation of policy objectives among Christian Democrats and more generally allowed them 'to develop their own peculiar notion of "Europe"' (Gehler and Kaiser 2001: 780) .
3
The ideological consensus that emerged -most emphatically perhaps at the Sorrento congress in April 1950 -was not only a distinctively anti-communist but also, to some extent at least, an anti-liberal one: it not only opposed the areligious materialism of Stalin's Russia, but also linked the horrors of the two World Wars to the ostensibly liberal roots of modern nationalism (Gisch 1990: 480-484; Acanfora 2015) . 4 At any rate, these shared ideological commitments also led Christian Democrats to converge on preferences concerning European integration -a convergence that, as one historian notes, was a 'precondition for 3 The necessity of agreeing on shared goals was widely recognised by Christian Democratic actors, as is evidenced in many recorded passages and communiqués. To cite just one example, the NEI's official message of 1 January 1949, which it addressed to the European public, stresses at the outset that 'One cannot establish a European union … without agreement on a common ideology' (Message NEI 1949, ACDP Archives, NEI no. VI-004-002 or 004-059/3). 4 The 'political report' of that congress, which was attended by leading statesmen from 15 European countries, is insightful here. It starts by emphasising that 'Christian Democratic movements have acquired a predominant position in postwar European political life. They have a double mission that no other political force is capable of fulfilling: (a) To improve the lot of workers … (b) To create a solid international community, or rather a supranational one. These two aims must, or rather can, be achieved only by democratic means.' Later, it is stated that 'The Christian Democratic movements are by their nature anti-totalitarian … we fight Communism because it bars the way to the creating of a Christian society' and that 'If by liberalism is meant the economic regime of complete laisser-aller, to that extent Christian Democracy is anti-liberal' (NEI, Congrès de Sorrente, ACDP Archives, NEI no. VI-004-011/4). With all that in mind, we may turn now to the question of whether the justdiscussed model of transnational organisation aimed at exercising supra-state constituent power satisfies the desiderata specified at the outset of this section.
How does the transnational partisan account of constituent power fare in this respect?
So far, it seems clear that it can satisfy desideratum (1), that which emphasises that the supra-state constituent power in Europe ought to be a 'mixed' form of constituent power, whose participants act both in their capacity as members of states and as members of a (present or future) supranational polity. The crossborder communication enabled by transnational partisan networks can indeed induce dialogue between the two Habermasian 'personae.' There furthermore appears to be good reason to think that constituent power exercised via transnational partisan networks is in principle a feasible organisational model (thus satisfying desideratum 3a). It may be considered feasible not only because it has been powerfully demonstrated to be workable provided that the requisite political will is available. Also, and perhaps more importantly, since it obtains its norm-creating power and legitimisation at the member state level it does not demand a complex supra-national institutional structure to operate effectively.
This leads to a third point: in relying on electoral support in national political arenas, the model also specifies from which channels its sociological legitimacy can be expected to flow (thus satisfying desideratum 3c).
Justifying and sustaining constituent power: The role of ideology
Two of the above-stipulated desiderata have not been addressed yet. These are desideratum (2) -which demands that an action-guiding model of constituent power must allow for participation and contestation -and desideratum (3b) -which highlights that such a model will have to be underpinned by ideational foundations that help justify and sustain the collective pursuit of supra-state constituent power. I will take these in reverse order, speaking first to (3b).
Before doing so, however, a more fundamental question needs handling. Why does it matter exactly that supra-state constituent power can rely on ideational foundations that support its justification and coordinated pursuit?
As far as justification is concerned, one might say that, insofar as supra-state constituent power is not exercised directly by citizens but indirectly via elected representatives, as it is the case in the model the present paper concentrates on, it can claim to be exercised in a democratic fashion only if as its exercise can be justified to citizens (cf. Böckenförde 2006: 103) . For justifications to be accepted, though, the reasons given for particular constitutional decisions -for example concerning the shape a future supranational order will take -must be rendered meaningful and intelligible to citizens. Here it helps a great deal to be able to draw on ideational foundations -ideas, values, and rhetorical figures -that have resonance with a wider public because they form part of political ideologies that are deeply rooted in the relevant societies (cf. White and Ypi 2016: ch. 3). A model of constituent power that centres on partisanship appears naturally well-suited to offer something in the way of ideational resources that facilitate the justification and sustained collective pursuit of constitutional founding or reform. For partisanship may be seen as a powerful underpinning not just to the sort of political commitment that reinforces the motivation of agents to act as constituent power, but also to the kind of justificatory activity necessary to endow the exercise of constituent power with democratic legitimacy (Rosenblum 2008; White and Ypi 2016) . Ideology is not something to look to with scepticism when it comes to constituent power, in other words; rather, it should be regarded as providing socially rooted normative ideas that can be harnessed for the successful enactment of the latter (cf. Kalyvas 2006) .
A minimum requirement that must be met in order for an ideology to provide a suitable ideational underpinning for supra-state constituent power is that it can be reframed in transnational terms, as transcending particular geographical settings rather than reflecting the viewpoint of specific local constituencies (White and Ypi 2016: 202-203 A glance at the Christian Democratic model of supra-state constituent power outlined here helps to better understand what it means to 'transnationalise' a 6 Arguably this will not work for all ideologies, especially not those that define themselves against their neighbours. But as the history of transnational nationalism demonstrates, even political orientations that one would instinctively expect to resist 'transnationalisation' can be cast as aspiring to be a transnational community of commitments (Herren 2017; Zúquete 2015) .
political ideology, to 'localise' that ideology in the context of Europe, as well as to employ it as a justificatory resource.
Above I have already noted that an ideological consensus emerged among
Christian Democrats in the post-war era, one that had not only anti-communist but also anti-liberal pretensions. This consensus was structured around views that go back to the advent of Christian Democracy as a political movement, most importantly the doctrine of 'personalism,' which sees the human being as constantly embedded in groups and natural communities that are not necessarily coextensive with the nation state (hence the opposition to the species of political liberalism that centres on powerful secular and centralised nation states), and the notion that Europe is a spiritual realm at the origin of which Christianity lies (hence the opposition to the materialist world view that characterises communism and, to some extent at least, also liberalism) (Forlenza 2017: 268-269; Kaiser 2007: 228-229) . It is easy to see how these ideas could ground a transnational vision for a unified Europe that is, at the same time, still 'local' enough to appeal to shared historical understandings of what
Europe is (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 196) .
In fact, much as the twin ideas of personalism and Europe as a distinctively
Christian realm supported the project of establishing a unified Europe with shared trans-or supranational political institutions, they also opened the door to very narrow conceptions of where the boundaries of Europe lie. 7 In particular, the notion of Europe as a spiritual space that is, at bottom, a 7 To get a flavour of the language used, consider the 1948 statement of the NEI's Cultural Commission on 'Europe as a Cultural Unit': 'The European spirit, which has always striven for unity and can never exist in a diaspora, has been and is the conscience of mankind. … [and] [t]he unifying life-force of Europe has always been Christianity' (ACDP Archives, NEI no. VI-004-101(4)).
Christian civilizational project often went hand in hand with idealisations of the pre-modern and pre-national Catholic West or Abendland. From this, it is only a short step to the kind of anti-Protestantism that conceives the boundaries of Europe as congruent with the Catholic countries of Western Europe, not to mention the tendency to assert the primacy of Catholicism over non-Christian religions (cf. Rosenboim 2017: 252-257) . Even among the EU's 'founding fathers' positions of this sort were not uncommon (Forlenza 2017: 272-273) .
Be that as it may -I shall return to these more problematic features of Christian Democratic ideology in the concluding section -what cannot be denied is that the Christian Democratic rationale for an integrated Europe was ultimately a powerful one, and one that resonated sufficiently with mass audiences to serve the purposes of political justification. It is of course true that Christian Democratic politicians, even if they held this view, rarely publicly presented their plans of an integrated Europe in terms of creating a democratic Carolingian Empire that restores the natural order of European history.
Nonetheless, the idea of Europe 'as an ideal and moral fatherland understood in no way as in opposition to, but rather as a natural development of, the traditional [national] fatherland' was a recurring trope in the political rhetoric (and writing) of key Christian Democratic figures (Forlenza 2017: 276 and 279 ).
This trope could be usefully employed to justify the integration of nation states into a larger supranational order that required delegating sovereignty to new
European bodies, at a time when historicised religious or quasi-religious arguments still had traction with mass publics.
The distinctive political ideas that undergird transnational Christian Democracy are complex, and so are the ways in which they have been put to use. The main point to note is that Christian Democratic ideology provided a potent ideational foundation for the exercise of constituent power aimed at creating a united Europe after World War II; the fact that 'the core ideological concepts of Christian democratic politics seemed ready-made for European integration' (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 196) considerably facilitated the coordinated enactment and justification of the major constitutional changes the members of the transnational network of Christian Democrats intended. No doubt, then, desideratum (3b) is also satisfied by the Christian Democratic model of supra-state constituent power.
Constituent power without participation?
This leaves us with desideratum (2), which plays up the importance of popular participation and contestation. As discussed in the paper's first section, a primary normative requirement that must be met by accounts of supra-state constituent power in the EU is that they include citizens more directly in the exercise of constituent power; citizens ought to be given the opportunity to participate actively in constitution-making activities and be able to contest past constitutional arrangements on their own terms. Can the proposed strategy of grounding constituent power in transnational partisanship deliver on this concern?
One way of looking at the practice of transnational partisanship is to see it as almost inevitably elitist. Accordingly, it may well be that its component parts - Should we infer from this that the Christian Democratic model of supra-state constituent power fails to satisfy desideratum (2), and hence that the model is inadequate as a blueprint for constituent power in the EU? A modest qualification of this view would highlight that, even if citizens were largely excluded from participation, the parties whose elites associated transnationally with the aim of shaping Europe's constitutional order still enjoyed widespread electoral support domestically, in the six original member states of the ECSC and EEC. The acquiescence of mass publics would at least seem to weaken the concern that a failure to satisfy desideratum (2) disallows the model as a whole.
One might be tempted to go one step further and draw a normative conclusion from this observation: namely that desideratum (2) should generally be framed more loosely, being accommodated to circumstances where discretionary decision-making by political elites is widely considered legitimate by citizens.
The intuition is that, while it cannot be denied that participation matters, it would be implausible to assert its ultimate importance in cases where 
Revisions to the Christian Democratic model
These initial reflections on the shortcomings of the Christian Democratic model of 'networked' constituent power instructively reveal that some revisions to the model are required if it is to be normatively defensible and capable of providing a point of orientation for supra-state constituent power in the EU today. While the model has many attractive features, and has been demonstrated to be in principle feasible, it cannot be adopted without modifications.
In these final paragraphs, I want to suggest three necessary amendments. The first has already been evinced in the prior section: in contrast to the elitism of Christian Democrats, contemporary efforts to harness transnational partisan networks for the exercise of constituent power beyond the state ought to involve citizens in a participative fashion.
The normative argument for conceiving constituent power in participative terms has already been rehearsed. The main concern, to repeat, is that constitutional acts cannot plausibly be said to be the product of a decision by 'the people' if the latter are merely the recipients of decisions that are made without their involvement. Another question is the practical one of how transnational partisan networks could be designed in a sufficiently participatory and inclusive fashion. There are no doubt serious obstacles in the way. Chief amongst these is the challenge of scope: it is difficult enough for a small number of political elites to effectively coordinate across borders; these difficulties are multiplied when larger numbers of citizens are involved, especially if most or all of them are supposed to have a say on decisions.
How could these hurdles be overcome? What is certain is that some democratic division of labour is unavoidable. Even the most inclusive and participatory model of transnational partisan coordination we may be able to imagine cannot continually include all of its members in its decision procedures. Too geographically dispersed are the individuals involved to ensure that all of them have a seat at the table; too many potential voices will exist there to be convened in the same forum; and if ordinary citizens are to be implicated in the process, most probably their time constraints will also constrain their participation. Yet even if mechanisms of delegation or representation will necessarily be part of transnational partisanship, there are still diverse ways of including citizens.
One would be to place the emphasis on national 'nodes' of the partisan network as sites of popular participation, and link these nodes together in a democratic fashion. The local chapters of the participant parties could accordingly provide venues in which citizens engage in deliberations about the larger constitutional project they seek to realise and select representatives who stand up for them in those transnational fora where decisions are taken (Wolkenstein 2016: 316) . The organisational model adopted by the emerging transnational party DiEM25 may be interpreted along these lines: its aim is to connect the views and ideas of local activists and supporters to the transnational level via democratic representatives, relying both on participatory forms of party membership and intra-party accountability. Whether this model is sustainable in practice remains to be seen, of course. But on its face, it seems capable of overcoming the challenge of scope I have highlighted.
The second modification I propose is relevantly related to the first but cannot be assimilated to it. This is that, contrary to Christian Democratic practice, future transnational partisan projects that seek to shape the EU's constitution must be ready to submit actions to public approval.
As we have seen earlier, many Christian Democratic partisans who were engaged in the transnational project of constitutionalising core Europe tended to be sceptical of mass politics. If one consequence of this was that their transnational groups remained highly exclusive (think of the Geneva Circles),
another was that they refused to submit their constitutional decisions to public approval. Relying on the acquiescence of mass publics, they rather proceeded in a mode described by one commentator as 'emergency regime, with regular steps of constitutional significance taken by executive decision, legitimacy sought in securitising narratives, and dissent discredited as resurgent nationalism' (White 2016: 312) . Political justification was intermittently offered, but popular authorisation was rarely directly sought.
Transnationally enacted constituent power, it seems, will have to be careful not to regress to a form of 'emergency politics' if it is to be democratically defensible. While it is true that moments of constitutional change are exceptional moments where politics departs, to some extent at least, from the constraints of existing political and legal frameworks, agents of exceptional action can only plausibly claim that their decisions were democratic when they obtained approval from a wider public. One straightforward way in which this change. Yet it is also possible to imagine institutional devices that are less prone to induce uncertainty, and perhaps even better suited for constitutional politics.
The kind of constitutional 'crowdsourcing' that has been tried out in Iceland would seem to provide a model that avoids the just-discussed pitfalls of more 'plebiscitary' forms of seeking public approval (Landemore 2015) . An initial worry concerning this suggestion is that it smuggles substantive normative commitments into the theory of constituent power and thereby preempts the judgments of citizens as to what sort of constitution they prefer and what reasons they provide in support of it -a criticism analogous to that which I have levelled at accounts of constituent power that leave no space for citizen participation. But this is not my intention. My point is not that the Christian Democratic idea of Europe as discussed above is objectionable from the point of view of justice -though the case for this view could easily be made -but that it is arguably out of sync with the realities of contemporary Europe and hence impotent as an ideational underpinning for constituent power. The concern is pragmatic, not moral, in substance: widespread mobilisation and effective justification will be difficult to achieve with a specifically Catholic story of Europe unity.
That this might be the case has certainly been sensed by many Christian Democratic parties in the last two decades or so. As two observers note, many have 'completely erased any reference, even perfunctory, to religion' in their political agendas (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 203) , which has also informed their defence of an integrated Europe. Key Christian Democratic politicians today rarely invoke ideas of a spiritual 'community of fate' when they speak of the EU; the dominant diction is rather one that asserts the lack of alternatives to EU integration (White 2016; Seville 2017) . The task for future transnational partisan projects aimed at constitutional change is to develop an ideational substrate that is capable of challenging this understanding of Europe without relapsing into an analogous emergency rhetoric or an excessively narrow conception of Europe's boundaries. Current attempts to present constitutional change as the only means to secure the EU's survival -the strategy of DiEM25 (Redder 2017 ) -would seem to fall short of these requirements. Even if effective on a short timescale, such moves risk excluding those who are uncertain as to whether survival is a goal worth pursuing in the first place, and may justify circumventing public approval when critical decisions are made. To be sustainable, transnational partisan projects must employ a broader, and more long-term vision of Europe.
Conclusion
Recent times have seen a spirited debate on constitutional politics in the EU, with many scholars and activists problematizing that the constitutional order of Europe is insufficiently politicised. The guiding thought is that the EU can only claim to be genuinely democratic if its citizens can be considered the source of its constitution, and the subjects with whom sovereignty ultimately rests -which implies that constitutionalisation must not be driven solely by courts or political elites that act in isolation from practices of political contestation. The forward-looking task, then, is to reflect on ways in which EU citizens could be transformed into a constituent power, ideally one that operates above the level individual member states.
The present paper has outlined a particular institutional model for supra-state It is at least imaginable that, once a critical mass of citizens supports the idea of constitutional change, governing parties that were not initially in favour of that idea become willing to cooperate in transnational constitutional politics. And of course, one might also reasonably ask whether there is anything wrong with models of constitutional change being demanding. That constitutional change should be easy is not a notion commonly entertained at the level of nationstates, and there is little reason to think that we should revise that intuition when it comes to exercises of supra-state constituent power.
